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Abstract—This paper investigates the problem of detection and
classification of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the presence
of wireless interference signals using a passive radio frequency
(RF) surveillance system. The system uses a multistage detector
to distinguish signals transmitted by a UAV controller from the
background noise and interference signals. First, RF signals
from any source are detected using a Markov models-based
naïve Bayes decision mechanism. When the receiver operates
at a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 10 dB, and the threshold,
which defines the states of the models, is set at a level 3.5
times the standard deviation of the preprocessed noise data, a
detection accuracy of 99.8% with a false alarm rate of 2.8% is
achieved. Second, signals from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth emitters, if
present, are detected based on the bandwidth and modulation
features of the detected RF signal. Once the input signal is
identified as a UAV controller signal, it is classified using machine
learning (ML) techniques. Fifteen statistical features extracted
from the energy transients of the UAV controller signals are fed
to neighborhood component analysis (NCA), and the three most
significant features are selected. The performance of the NCA and
five different ML classifiers are studied for 15 different types of
UAV controllers. A classification accuracy of 98.13% is achieved
by k-nearest neighbor classifier at 25 dB SNR. Classification
performance is also investigated at different SNR levels and for
a set of 17 UAV controllers which includes two pairs from the
same UAV controller models.
Index Terms—Interference, machine learning, Markov mod-
els, RF fingerprinting, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), UAV
detection and classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are be-coming ubiquitous in modern society. The recent popu-
larity of UAVs is mainly due to the advancement in micro-
electro-mechanical systems-based precision sensors, such as
inertial motion units and gyroscopes, which are used for guid-
ance, navigation, and control of UAVs. Consequently, UAVs
have become relatively cheap and affordable. They are finding
new applications in areas such as surveillance, smart policing,
search and rescue missions, infrastructure inspections, package
delivery, and precision agriculture [2]. Judging by the current
trend in UAV applications, it is expected that UAVs will
become an integral part of modern society. However, there
are security and privacy issues associated with the ubiquity of
UAVs.
In recent times, UAVs have been used in ways that intro-
duce a threat to public safety [3]. There have been several
instances where hobby drones have been used to transport
illegal drugs across prison walls. In addition, drones have
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carried out espionage attacks which pose serious risk to public
safety. Recently, drones operated by dissidents have flown
into sensitive national infrastructures like nuclear reactors
and airports [4]. Moreover, drones are becoming tools for
cyberattack and terrorism. For instance, Wi-Fi sniffing UAVs
can eavesdrop on smartphone users and steal sensitive data
without being detected [5], [6].
Considering the security and privacy issues associated with
UAVs, accurate detection and classification of these vehicles
are vital to public safety and national security. One promising
technique for UAV detection is based on the analysis of radio
frequency (RF) signals from UAV controllers. In [7], drone
pilots are identified by analyzing RF signals captured from
the drone controllers. The pilots’ behavioral biometrics can be
identified from the captured signals using machine learning
(ML) techniques. The ML algorithms are trained using the
RF signals when the controller is handled by the legitimate
owner of the device. That way, it is possible to identify
different drones and their pilots. However, while the behavioral
biometrics of drone pilot is an important information for
drone detection, an adversary could be anyone whose behavior
metrics we have no prior knowledge of. Therefore, in order
to accurately detect and identify an adversary drone, one
should focus on identifying the intrinsic signature of the drone
controller itself. These intrinsic signatures can be extracted
from the RF signals transmitted by the UAV controllers and
referred to as the RF fingerprints of the controllers.
Since the communication signals of most commercial and
hobby grade UAVs are transmitted in the same frequency band
as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth transmissions, it becomes challenging
to detect and identify RF signals from the UAV controllers
in the presence of these interferers. Moreover, surveillance
and electronic warfare systems should be able to differentiate
UAVs from different manufacturers. For instance, the identity
of a UAV can provide useful information about the payload,
operational range, control signal characteristics (e.g., for jam-
ming such signals), and the threat capability of the associated
UAV. Accurate identification of UAVs is also important in
digital forensic analysis of aerial threats.
In this work, we propose a multistage UAV detection and
an ML-based classification system for identifying 17 different
UAV controllers in the presence of wireless interference, i.e.,
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth devices. The multistage UAV detection
system consists of two detectors. The first detector employs
a two-state Markov model based naïve Bayes algorithm in
deciding if the captured data contains RF signals or not.
Once an RF signal is detected, the second stage detector
decides if the signal comes from a UAV controller or an
interference source. Given that the detected RF signal is from
an interference source, the source class is identified as Wi-Fi
or Bluetooth. On the other hand, if the detected signal is from
a UAV controller, the signal is transferred to the ML-based
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classification system to determine the make and model of the
UAV controller. In an earlier work [1], the authors proposed
a system for detecting and classifying 14 different UAV con-
trollers. The system design assumes the absence of interference
signals. However, this assumption is not always correct. The
contributions of the current work are summarized as follows:
1) The paper investigates the problem of detecting and
classifying signals from UAV controllers in the presence
of co-channel wireless interference. We consider inter-
ference from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sources and describe
a methodology to detect the UAVs. The interference
detection ensures the proposed UAV detection system is
robust against false alarms and missed target detection. In
addition, in [1], we used two fixed thresholds, positioned
at ± 3σ, to transform the captured signal into three-
state Markov models, where σ is the standard deviation
of the noise signal in the environment. However, in the
current work, we use a single threshold to transform
the captured signal into two-state Markov models, which
reduces overall complexity. We also define a procedure
to determine the optimum threshold value based on the
available training data. Besides, in the current study, we
evaluate the detection performance for different thresh-
olds based on the false alarm rate (FAR).
2) We introduce the concept of energy transient for the
extraction of RF-based features and show how effective it
is for the classification of the UAV controller signals. The
energy transient is computed using the representation of
the RF signals in energy-time-frequency domain. From
the energy transient, 15 statistical features are extracted
for the UAV classification. The performance of five
different ML algorithms are compared using the proposed
RF fingerprinting technique. In addition, we investigate
the neighborhood component analysis (NCA) as a prac-
tical algorithm for feature selection in the classification
problem. The classification results using the three most
significant features, selected by the NCA, are compared
with those when all the 15 RF features are used. We
also evaluate the classification performance at different
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). For an SNR of 25 dB,
the results show that the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) and
random forest (RandF) are the best performing classifiers,
achieving accuracy of 98.13% and 97.73%, respectively,
when the three most significant RF-based features are
used for the classification of 15 UAV contollers.
3) We study the confusion that results when attempting to
classify UAV controllers of the same make and model.
This is important in digital forensic analysis and de-
tecting decoys in surveillance systems. To investigate
this confusion, we included two pairs of identical UAV
controllers to a pool of 13 different UAV controllers. That
is, we capture control signals from 17 UAV controllers
and evaluate the ability of the proposed classification
system at different SNRs. For an SNR of 25 dB, kNN
and RandF achieve accuracy of 95.53% and 95.18%,
respectively, when the three most significant RF features
are used. To the best of our knowledge, past studies on
UAV classification using RF techniques considers only
a limited number of different make and model UAV
controllers, often less than 10 [8], [9].
High-resolution oscilloscopeUAV
UAV remote 
controller
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Bluetooth interference source
Captured 
waveform
Fig. 1. The scenario of the RF-based UAV detection system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II provides a brief overview of the related work.
Section III describes the multistage detection system, and
Section IV introduces the methodology to detect Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth interference signals. Feature extraction and the RF
fingerprinting-based UAV classification system are explained
in Section V. The experimental setup is described in Sec-
tion VI while the detection and classification results are pre-
sented in Section VII. The paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
UAV detection and classification through RF signals can be
grouped into two major headings: RF fingerprinting and Wi-Fi
fingerprinting techniques. These techniques use an RF sensing
device to capture the RF communication signal between a
UAV and its controller. In RF fingerprinting techniques,
physical layer features and signatures of the captured signal
are used for the detection and classification of the UAV or its
controller. On the other hand, Wi-Fi fingerprinting techniques
extracts the medium access control (MAC) and network layer
features of the captured UAV RF transmission.
A. RF Fingerprinting-Based UAV Detection and Classification
RF fingerprinting techniques rely on the unique characteris-
tics of the RF signal waveforms captured from different UAV
controllers. Experimental investigations show that most of the
commercial UAVs have unique RF signatures which is due
to the circuitry design and modulation techniques employed.
Therefore, RF fingerprints extracted from the UAV or its
remote controller signals can be used as a basis for detection
and classification of the UAVs.
In [10], RF fingerprints of the UAV’s wireless control
signals are extracted by computing the amplitude envelope
of the signal. The dimensionality of the processed signal is
reduced by performing principal component analysis (PCA),
and the lower-dimensional data is fed into an auxiliary
classifier Wasserstein generative adversarial networks (AC-
WGANs). The AC-WGANs achieves an overall classification
rate of 95% when four different types of UAVs are considered.
In [11], drones are detected by analyzing the RF background
activities along with the RF signals emitted when the drones
are operated in different modes. Afterward, RF spectrum of the
drone signal is computed using the discrete Fourier transform
(DFT). The drone classification system is designed by training
a deep neural network with the RF spectrum data of different
drones. The system shows an accuracy of 99.7% when two
drones are classified, 84.5% with four drones, and 46.8% with
ten drones.
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Fig. 2. RF signals captured from four different UAV controllers: (a) Graupner MC-32, (b) Spektrum DX6e, (c) Futaba T8FG, and (d) DJI Phantom 4 Pro.
In [12], an industry integrated counter-drone solution is
described. The solution is based on a network of distributed
RF sensors. In this system, RF signals from different UAV
controllers are detected using an energy detector. Afterward,
the signals of interest are classified using RF spectral shape
correlation features. Besides, distributed RF sensors make it
possible to localize the UAV controller using time difference
of arrival (TDoA) or multilateration techniques. However, this
industrial solution is quite expensive.
B. Wi-Fi Fingerprinting-Based UAV Detection and Classifica-
tion
Wi-Fi fingerprinting-based techniques are motivated by the
fact that some UAVs use Wi-Fi links for control and video
streaming. The RF sensing system consists primarily of a
Wi-Fi packet-sniffing device, which can intercept the Wi-
Fi data traffic between a UAV and its remote controller.
In [9], unauthorized Wi-Fi controlled UAVs are detected by a
patrolling drone using a set of Wi-Fi statistical features. The
extracted features include MAC addresses, root-mean-square
(RMS) of the Wi-Fi packet length, packet duration, average
packet inter-arrival time, among others. These features are
used to train different ML algorithms which perform the UAV
classification task. In [9], the random tree and random forest
classifiers achieve the best performance as measured by the
true positive and false positive rates.
In [13], drone presence is detected by eavesdropping on
Wi-Fi channels between the drone and its controller. The
system detects drones by analyzing the impact of their unique
vibration and body shifting motions on the Wi-Fi signals
transmitted by the drone. The system achieves accuracy above
90% at 50 meters.
In general, a major concern with the Wi-Fi fingerprinting
techniques is the privacy. This is because the same Wi-
Fi detection system can spoof Wi-Fi traffic data from a
smartphone user or a private Wi-Fi network. In addition, only
a limited number of commercial drones employ Wi-Fi links
for video streaming and control. Most commercial drones use
proprietary communication links.
Besides RF and Wi-Fi fingerprinting techniques, several
other techniques have been investigated for UAV detection, in-
cluding radar-based techniques, acoustic techniques, and com-
puter vision techniques [14]. However, as discussed in [14],
traditional radar systems are not so effective in detecting UAVs
with small radar cross sections, and acoustic and computer
vision-based techniques are greatly impaired by ambient en-
vironmental conditions. In contrast, RF techniques are not
limited by these problems. We start by describing the design
of the multistage detector of our proposed RF-based system.
III. MULTISTAGE UAV SIGNAL DETECTION
We consider the scenario shown in Fig. 1, where a pas-
sive RF surveillance system listens for the control signals
transmitted between a UAV and its remote controller. The
main hardware components of the surveillance system are
2.4 GHz RF antenna and a high-frequency oscilloscope, which
is capable of sampling the captured data at 20 Gsa/s. The
high sampling rate enables the surveillance system to capture
high-resolution waveform transient features of any detected
RF signal. The waveform transient features of different UAV
controllers are unique. This is a useful property for detecting
and classifying RF signals from different UAV controllers.
Fig. 2 illustrates sample RF signals captured from four dif-
ferent UAV controllers. The figure shows each signal has a
distinct waveform transient or shape which can be exploited
for identifying the source UAV controller.
Since most commercial UAVs operate in the 2.4 GHz band,
the passive RF surveillance system is designed to operate
in this frequency band. However, this also corresponds to
the operational band of Wi-Fi and mobile Bluetooth devices.
Therefore, in real wireless environment, signals from these
wireless sources will act as interference to the detection of
the UAV control signals.
Given the scenario in Fig. 1, the passive RF surveillance
system has to decide if the captured data comes from a
UAV controller, an interference source, or background noise.
In the case where the captured data comes from a UAV
controller, the detection system should be able to correctly
classify the UAV controller. However, if the detected signal
is from an interference source, the detection system should
be able to correctly identify the source, i.e., a Wi-Fi or
a Bluetooth device. Therefore, the detection problem is
a multi-hypothesis problem. For such problems, it is well
known that computational complexity increases as the number
of hypothesis increases. Consequently, the multi-hypothesis
detection problem can be simplified by using a multistage
sequential detector. In this system, each detection stage is a
simple binary hypothesis test which is much easier to solve.
The flowchart in Fig. 3 provides a high-level graphical
description of the entire system. The first step in detecting
and identifying a UAV controller is data capture. Usually, the
captured raw signal has a large size and is often very noisy.
Therefore, before detection and classification, the signals are
first pre-processed using multiresolution analysis. Next, the
processed signals are transferred to the multistage detection
system, which consists of two stages. In the first stage, the
detector employs naïve Bayesian hypothesis test in deciding
if the captured signal is an RF signal or noise. If the decision
is positive, the second stage detector is activated to decide
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Fig. 3. The system flowchart providing a graphical description of information
processing and flow of data through the system.
if the captured RF signal comes from an interference source
or a UAV controller. This detector uses bandwidth analysis
and modulation-based features for interference detection. If
the detected RF signal is not from a Wi-Fi or Bluetooth
interference source, it is presumed to be a signal transmitted
by a UAV controller. Consequently, the detected signal is
transferred to an ML-based classification system for accurate
identification of the UAV controller.
A. Pre-processing Step: Multiresolution Analysis
Captured RF data are pre-processed by means of wavelet-
based multiresolution analysis. It has been established that
multiresolution decomposition using discrete wavelet trans-
form (DWT) like the Haar wavelet transform is effective for
analyzing the information content of signals and images [15].
In this work, multiresolution decomposition of the captured
RF data are carried out using the two-level Haar transform as
shown in Fig. 4. Using this transform, the raw input signal
is decomposed into subbands, and important time-frequency
information can be extracted at different resolution levels [16].
In the first level, the input RF data are split into low- and high-
frequency components by means of the half band low-pass
(h[n]) and high-pass (g[n]) filters, respectively. This process is
followed by a dyadic decimation, or downsampling, of the fil-
ter outputs to produce the approximate coefficients, a1[n], and
detail coefficients, d1[n]. In the second level, a1[n] coefficients
are further decomposed in a similar manner, and the generated
d2[n] coefficients are taken as the final output (yT[n]). Then,
yT[n] is input to the multistage detection system. Moving from
g [n]
h [n]
g [n]
h [n]
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Fig. 4. The two-level discrete Haar wavelet transform for pre-processing of
the captured raw data.
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Fig. 5. (a) The sampled raw data y[n] captured from the remote controller
of a DJI Phantom 4 Pro UAV using an oscilloscope with a sampling rate
of 20 Gsa/s, and (b) the transformed data yT[n] obtained at the output of
the two-level Haar wavelet filter. Due to successive downsampling, yT[n] has
about 3.8× 106 fewer data samples than y[n].
left to right in Fig. 4, we get coarser representation of the
captured RF data. The output RF data will have fewer samples
due to the successive downsampling of the input RF data. This
reduces the computational complexity of the overall process.
Multiresolution analysis is also useful in detecting weak
signals in the presence of background noise and removing
the bias in the signals, leading to a higher detection accuracy,
which is required in applications like UAV threat detection.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of the Haar wavelet decomposition
on a sample signal captured from the controller of the DJI
Phantom 4 Pro UAV. It is clear from the figure that the wavelet
transform removes the bias in the signal alignment and reduces
the data size. It will be shown in Section V, the transformation
also preserves the characteristics of the original waveform.
After the pre-processing step, the data is transferred to the
first stage of the detection system, where we decide if the
captured data is an RF signal or noise.
B. Naïve Bayes Decision Mechanism for RF Signal Detection
In this stage, we first model the pre-processed RF data,
yT[n], using two-state Markov models for “RF signal" and
“noise" classes. This allows us to compute the likelihood
that the captured data come from either the signal or noise
class. According to the Bayesian decision theory, the optimum
detector is the one that maximizes the posterior probability.
Mathematically, let C ∈ {0, 1} be an index denoting the class
of the pre-processed RF data yT[n], where C = 1 when the
captured raw signal y[n] is an RF signal, and C = 0 otherwise.
Let SyT = [SyT(1), SyT(2), . . . , SyT(N)]
> be the state vector
representation of the given test data yT[n] containing N
samples, with SyT(i) ∈ {S1, S2}, i = 1, 2, .., N , and S1 and S2
being the two states in the Markov models. Then, the posterior
probability of the RF signal class given SyT is
P (C = 1|SyT) =
P (SyT |C = 1)P (C = 1)
P (SyT)
, (1)
where P (SyT |C = 1) is the likelihood function conditioned
on C = 1, P (C = 1) is the prior probability of the RF
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Fig. 6. Two-state Markov model and associated state transition probabilities
using δ = 3.5σ for (a) the RF signal class, and (b) the noise class.
signal class, and P (SyT) is the evidence. A similar expression
holds for the posterior probability P (C = 0|SyT). In practice,
since the evidence is not a function of C, it can be ignored.
Therefore, we are only interested in maximizing the numerator
in (1). That is,
Ĉ = argmax
C
P (SyT |C)P (C). (2)
We decide that the captured signal belongs to an RF signal
(i.e., C = 1), if
P (SyT |C = 1)P (C = 1) ≥ P (SyT |C = 0)P (C = 0). (3)
If we assume the prior probabilities of the signal and noise
class are equal, then the decision rule in (3) reduces to
P (SyT |C = 1) ≥ P (SyT |C = 0). (4)
Therefore, for a given test data, we need to compute and
compare the likelihood probabilities P (SyT |C = {0, 1}). First,
in order to compute the likelihood probability for the RF
signal and noise classes, we use large amount of training data
captured from multiple UAV controllers, Wi-Fi routers, mo-
bile Bluetooth emitters, and background noise. This training
data set is stored in a database as shown in Fig. 3. Since
the captured RF data (after sampling) is a discrete time-
varying waveform, we can model it as a stochastic sequence
of states/events. The likelihood probability of such a state
sequence can be computed based on the transitions between
the states of the generated Markov models.
A two-state Markov model for a given signal yT[n] can
be generated by mapping each sample in the signal to one
of the two states (S1 and S2). The samples whose absolute
amplitudes are less than or equal to a predetermined threshold
δ are considered as in state S1, while the samples with
absolute amplitude greater than δ are considered as in state
S2. Mathematically, the state transformation is performed as
follows:
SyT(n) =
{
S1, |yT[n]| ≤ δ
S2, |yT[n]| > δ . (5)
Based on the above rule, it is straightforward to transform
yT[n] into the state vector, SyT . Once SyT is obtained, the
probability of a transition between any two states is calculated.
Note that the state vector is generated based on the amplitude
of the signal samples in the wavelet domain. The choice of δ
in (5) depends on the operating SNR of the system and will
be discussed in Section VII-A. The transition count matrix,
TN , and the transition probability matrix, T P , are defined as
follows:
TN =
[
N11 N12
N21 N22
]
,T P =
[
p11 p12
p21 p22
]
=
TN∑
i,j Nij
, (6)
respectively, where Nij is the number of transitions from state
Si to Sj among all samples of yT[n], and pij = P (Si → Sj)
is the probability of a transition from state Si to Sj . The
matrix T P is obtained by normalizing the TN matrix with
the total number of samples in the signal. It is expected that
the transition probabilities generated for the signal class (UAV,
Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth) and the noise class will be significantly
different at modest SNR levels. Also, the choice of δ in (5)
dictates the transition probabilities for both the signal and
noise class. In Section VII-A, the threshold δ is expressed
in terms of the estimated standard deviation (σ) of the prepro-
cessed noise data captured from the environment. Moreover,
during the experiments, data is captured within a short-time
window (0.25 ms), thus we assume the environmental noise
is stationary during this interval.
Fig. 6 shows the two-state Markov models for the RF
signal and noise classes obtained from the training data using
δ = 3.5σ. From Fig. 6(a), we see that for the signal class, p22
is significantly higher than p11, p12, and p21. On the other
hand, from Fig. 6(b), we see that for the noise class, p11
is significantly higher than the other transition probabilities.
Based on these observations, the differences between the
state transition probabilities of each class can be utilized to
determine the class of a captured test signal.
Consequently, the likelihood of the test signal being an RF
signal can be calculated as follows:
P (SyT |C = 1) =
N−1∏
n=1
p(SyT(n)→ SyT(n+ 1)|C = 1)
=
∏
i,j={1,2}
T
TN (i,j)
PC=1
(i, j)
=
∏
i,j={1,2}
p
Nij
ij;C=1.
(7)
The product of the conditional transition probabilities in the
above equation gives the likelihood of obtaining the state
vector SyT given the hypothesis C = 1 is true. The log-
likelihood of the above expression is:
log (P (SyT |C = 1)) =
∑
i,j={1,2}
Nij log(pij;C=1). (8)
Similarly, the log-likelihood of the signal coming from a noise
class is calculated by
log (P (SyT |C = 0)) =
∑
i,j={1,2}
Nij log(pij;C=0). (9)
The decision will be favored to C = 1, if
log(P (SyT |C = 1)) ≥ log(P (SyT |C = 0)); otherwise,
C = 0. We discuss the detection results in Section VII-A. If
the captured test signal belongs to the RF signal class, then the
second stage detector is invoked to identify UAV controller-
type signals. Otherwise, the system continues sensing the
environment for the presence of signals as shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 7. Bandwidth analysis of (a) Wi-Fi signal, (b) Bluetooth signal from Motorola e5 cruise, and (c) Spektrum DX5e UAV controller signal.
TABLE I
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE WI-FI AND BLUETOOTH STANDARDS.
Standard Bluetooth (IEEE802.15.1 WPAN)
Wi-Fi (IEEE
802.11 WLAN)
Center frequency (GHz) 2.4 2.4/ 5
Bandwidth (MHz) 1 20/ 40/ 80/ 160
PHY modulation [18], [19] GFSK/FSK/DPSK DSSS/ OFDM
Range (m) variable >50
Data rate (Mbps) 2 variable
IV. DETECTION OF WI-FI AND BLUETOOTH
INTERFERENCE
In recent times, there has been interest in detecting Wi-
Fi and Bluetooth signals [17]. However, in the context of
RF-based UAV detection in urban environments, where the
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals are considered as interference,
there has been minimal research efforts. Fortunately, these
interference signals are well standardized and can be identified
by using the knowledge of their specifications. Table I provides
a brief summary of the specifications for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
transmissions. It is obvious that the signal bandwidth and the
modulation type are two important features for identifying
the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals. The second stage detector
exploits these features for detecting these interference sources.
The first step in deciding if the detected signal is a wireless
interference or not is to perform bandwidth analysis. This
is because Wi-Fi signals can be easily identified by their
bandwidth. According to Table I, Bluetooth 2.0 signals have
a bandwidth of 1 or 2 MHz, Wi-Fi signals have a bandwidth
of 20 MHz (or more) while all the UAV controller signals in
our database have bandwidth less than 10 MHz. Therefore, if
the detected RF signal has a bandwidth equal or greater than
20 MHz, it is classified as a Wi-Fi signal. Bandwidth analysis
is performed by taking the Fourier transform of the resampled
signal. Fig. 7 shows the result of the bandwidth analysis of a
typical Wi-Fi, a Bluetooth (from Motorola e5 cruise), and a
UAV (Spektrum DX5e) controller signal.
If the detected signal has a bandwidth less than 20 MHz, it is
assumed to be transmitted either from a Bluetooth interference
source or a valid UAV controller. Since most mobile Bluetooth
devices employ Gaussian frequency shift keying GFSK/FSK
modulation, it is reasonable to detect and discriminate these
devices by means of modulation features. In this study, two
GFSK/FSK modulation features, namely, frequency deviation
and symbol duration, will be used to discriminate Bluetooth
signals. Frequency deviation is a measure of the maximum
difference between the peak frequency in the GFSK/FSK
signal and the center frequency. On the other hand, sym-
bol duration is the minimum time interval in the observed
Bluetooth waveform or pulse. Therefore, using a GFSK/FSK
demodulator, these features can be extracted and used as the
basis for Bluetooth signal detection.
We consider a zero-crossing GFSK/FSK demodulator. It is
known that the Bluetooth GFSK/FSK signal is transmitted in
burst consisting of M data bits dm ∈ {−1,+1}, each bit
having a period Tb and average energy per bit Eb [20]. A
general model for such a signal is given as:
s(t) =
√
2Eb
Tb
. cos(2pifot+ ϕ(t, α) + ϕo) + n(t), (10)
where ϕ(t, α) is a phase modulating function, ϕo is an
arbitrary phase constant, fo is the operational frequency,
and n(t) is the channel noise component. The zero-crossing
demodulator considered herein for Bluetooth interference
detection is able to detect the time instants at which the
signal s(t) is equal to zero and has a positive slope, i.e.,
the zero-crossings. When a Bluetooth device transmits at
the basic rate using the standard GFSK/FSK modulation,
one symbol represents one bit. Therefore, the time interval
between consecutive zero-crossings is a measure of the
symbol duration of the Bluetooth signal.
Fig. 8 shows the results of the zero-crossing demodulation
of a Bluetooth signal from Motorola e5 cruise. The captured
Bluetooth signal and its fast Fourier transform (FFT) are
shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), respectively. From Fig. 8(b),
we see that the transmit frequency of the Bluetooth device
is 2.4 GHz. Afterward, the signal is shifted and resampled by
1/2000. The FFT of the resampled signal is shown in Fig. 8(c).
This figure shows that the bandwidth of the Bluetooth signal
is around 2 MHz, which is far less than 20 MHz. Next, the
resampled signal is demodulated by taking the derivative of
its phase angle, and the start point of the demodulated signal
is estimated using the Higuchi algorithm [21]. The Higuchi
algorithm detects the start point of the signal by measuring
the fractal dimensions of the signal. Once the start point is
detected, the frequency deviation is estimated as one half the
peak-to-peak frequency of the demodulated signal. Fig. 8(d)
shows a plot of the demodulated signal and the estimated start
point which is obtained using the Higuchi algorithm. From
the figure, the peak to peak frequency of the demodulated
signal is estimated as 551.12 kHz, and therefore, the frequency
deviation is 275.56 kHz.
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Fig. 8. Extraction of the modulation features of a Bluetooth interference signal from Motorola e5 cruise mobile device using zero-crossing demodulation
technique: (a) Raw signal, (b) FFT of the raw signal, (c) FFT of the shifted and resampled signal (by 1/2000), (d) the demodulated signal showing a
peak-to-peak frequency of 551.12 kHz, (e) binary signal, and (f) histogram of the time-interval between consecutive zero-crossings in the modulated signal.
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Fig. 9. Feature space showing the symbol duration and frequency deviation
of the signals from several mobile Bluetooth devices and UAV controllers.
Each UAV controller is represented by a circular marker of a unique color.
In order to estimate the symbol duration, the demodulated
signal is converted to a binary signal by using the mean
as a threshold. Fig. 8(e) shows the binary signal, where
binary one represents a positive frequency deviation, and a
binary zero represents a negative frequency deviation. Then,
we compute the derivative of the binary signals to locate the
zero-crossings. To ensure we accurately compute the symbol
duration, we compute the histogram of the time intervals
between consecutive zero-crossings. This is necessary because
channel distortions will cause some deviation in these in-
tervals. Fig. 8(f) shows the histogram of the time intervals
between consecutive zero-crossings for the Bluetooth signal.
The estimated symbol duration is 0.5 µs.
To validate the joint discriminating ability of these modu-
lation features, Bluetooth signals from six mobile phones and
signals from nine UAV controllers are collected. The mobile
phones are Iphone 7, Iphone XR, LG X charge, Motorola G
Play, Motorola e5 cruise, and Samsung Galaxy Note 9. The
UAV controllers considered are Jeti Duplex DC-16, Spektrum
DX5e, Spektrum DX6e, Spektrum DX6i, Spektrum JR X9303,
FlySky FS-T6, Graupner MC-32, HK-T6A, and Turnigy 9X.
The UAV signals are frequency modulated as well. Therefore,
all the collected signals are demodulated using the zero-
crossing technique. Fig. 9 shows the feature space of the
demodulated Bluetooth and UAV controller signals. The figure
shows a clear clustering of the Bluetooth signals from different
mobile phones. All the Bluetooth signals have a symbol
duration of 0.5µs and a frequency deviation of less than
350 kHz. Therefore, the frequency deviation and symbol dura-
tion can be used as features in a simple maximum likelihood
classifier for identifying Bluetooth interference signals. If the
detected signal is not from a Bluetooth interference source,
it is presumed to be an emission from a UAV controller and
transferred to the UAV classification system.
V. UAV CLASSIFICATION USING RF FINGERPRINTS
The input to the ML classifiers are the RF-based features
extracted from the energy-time-frequency domain representa-
tion of the UAV controller signals. For this representation, we
use the spectrogram method. The spectrogram of any signal
is computed using the squared magnitude of the discrete time
short-time Fourier transform (STFT)
Spectrogram(m,ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
k=−∞
yT[k]w[k −m]e−jωk
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (11)
where yT[n] is the pre-processed signal captured by the
surveillance system, m is discrete time, ω is the frequency,
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Fig. 10. (a) The spectrogram and, (b) the energy trajectory of the UAV
controller signal shown in Fig. 5.
and w[n] is a sliding window function that acts as a filter. The
spectrogram analysis of the captured RF signals can reveal
the transmit frequency of the signal as well as the frequency
hopping patterns. The spectrogram of the signal captured from
the remote controller of the DJI Phantom 4 Pro UAV (the
signal in Fig. 5) is shown in Fig. 10(a). In computing the
spectrogram, the signal is divided into segments of length 128
with an overlap of 120 samples between adjoining segments.
Then, a Hamming window is used, followed by a 256-point
DFT. The spectrogram shows that the transmit frequency of
the signal is 2.4 GHz.
The spectrogram displays the energy distribution of the
signal along the time-frequency axis. Therefore, the energy
trajectory can be computed from the spectrogram by taking
the maximum energy values along the time-axis. From this
distribution, we estimate the energy transient by searching
for the most abrupt change in the mean or variance of the
normalized energy trajectory. The energy transient defines the
transient characteristics of the signal in energy domain. For
the RF signal in Fig. 5, the normalized energy trajectory and
the corresponding energy transient are shown in Fig. 10(b).
Once the energy transient is detected, RF fingerprints (a
set of 15 statistical features) are extracted. Each feature is
a physical descriptor of the energy transients and can provide
valuable information for ML-based classification of the signals
captured from different UAV controllers. Table II gives the
list of the extracted features used in this study. The features
extracted from 17 UAV controllers are used to train five
TABLE II
STATISTICAL FEATURES.
Features Formula Measures
Mean (µ) 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi Central tendency
Absolute mean (x¯) 1
N
∑N
i=1 |xi| Central tendency
Standard
deviation(σT )
[
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(xi − x¯)2
] 1
2 Dispersion
Skewness (γ)
∑N
i=1(xi−x¯)3
(N−1)σ3
T
Asymmetry/shape
descriptor
Entropy (H) −∑Ni=1 xi log2 xi Uncertainty
Root mean square
(xrms)
[
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i
] 1
2 Magnitude/Average
power
Root (xr)
[
1
N
∑N
i=1 |xi|
1
2
]2
Magnitude
Kurtosis (k)
∑N
i=1(xi−x¯)4
(N−1)σ4
T
Tail/shape
descriptor
Variance 1
N
∑N
i=1(xi − µ)2 Dispersion
Peak value (xpv) max(xi) Amplitude
Peak to peak (xppv) max(xi)−min(xi) Waveform ampli-tude
Shape factor(xsf )
xrms
x¯ Shape descriptor
Crest factor xmaxxrms Peak extremity
Impulse factor xmaxx¯ Impulse
Clearance factor xmaxxr Spikiness
different ML algorithms: kNN, RandF, discriminant analysis
(DA), support vector machine (SVM), and neural networks
(NN). Since some of the features may be correlated, therefore
redundant, we also perform feature selection to reduce the
computational cost of the classification algorithm.
A. Feature Selection Using NCA
The NCA algorithm is a nearest neighbor-based feature
weighting algorithm, which learns a feature weighting vector
by maximizing a leave-one-out classification accuracy using
a gradient based optimizer. It is a non-parametric, embedded,
and supervised learning method for feature selection. NCA
learns the weighting vector/matrix by which the primary data
are transformed into a lower-dimensional space [22]. In this
lower-dimensional space, the features are ranked according to
a weight metric, with the more important features receiving
higher weight values.
Given a set of training samples representing the different
UAV controllers, U = {(x1, Y1), . . . , (xi, Yi), . . . , (xn, Yn)},
where xi is a p-dimensional feature vector extracted from the
energy transient, Yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} are the corresponding
class labels, and C is the number of classes. Then the
NCA learns the feature weighting vector w by maximizing a
regularized objective function f(w) with respect to the weight
of each features. The regularized objective function is defined
as:
f(w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1,i6=j
pijYij − λ
p∑
r=1
w2r
 ,where
pij =
{
k(dw(xi,xj))∑n
j=1,i 6=j k(dw(xi,xj))
if i 6= j
0, if i = j
,
Yij =
{
1, if Yi = Yj
0, otherwise
,
(12)
n is the number of samples in the feature set, λ is the
regularization term, wr is a weight associated with the rth
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Fig. 11. NCA ranking of all the 15 RF fingerprints extracted from 17 UAV
controllers.
TABLE III
UAV CATALOGUE.
Make Model Make Model
DJI
Inspire 1 Pro
Spektrum
DX5e
Matrice 100 DX6e
Matrice 6001 DX6i
Phantom 4 Pro1 JR X9303
Phantom 3
Futaba T8FG Graupner MC-32
HobbyKing HK-T6A FlySky FS-T6
Turnigy 9X Jeti Duplex DC-16
feature, and pij is the probability with which each point
xi selects another point xj as its reference neighbor and
inherits the class label of the latter [23]. The parameter Yij
is an indicator function, dw(xi,xj) =
∑p
r=1 w
2
r |xir − xjr|
is a weighted distance function between xi and xj , and
k(a) = exp( aσ ) is some kernel function. Thus, NCA is a
kernel-based feature selection algorithm that selects the most
descriptive and informative features by optimizing (12) using
gradient update techniques.
Fig. 11 shows the results of the NCA ranking of 15 features
extracted from the 17 UAV controllers. The experimental
setup and structure of the captured data are described in
Section VI. In Fig. 11, we see that NCA ranks the RF
fingerprints according to their weight values. It turns out that
the shape factor is the most discriminative feature in the
feature set. The next significant feature is the kurtosis which
describes the tailedness of the energy trajectory curve. Next are
variance and standard deviation. On the other hand, entropy,
which measures the uncertainty in the data set, is the least
significant feature. Based on these results, the ML algorithms
can safely discard the less important features and still achieve
good (even better) classification performance. This is because
discarding the less significant features reduces the chance of
overfitting. In addition, for large-scale classification problems,
there can be huge computational saving in training and testing
the classifiers with fewer number of features.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
During the experiments, RF signals are captured from 17
UAV controllers, six mobile Bluetooth devices (smart phones),
1A pair of these controllers is used in this study. For all other controllers,
only one of each type is considered.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12. (a) Indoor and (b) outdoor experimental scenarios for UAV signal
detection.
and a Wi-Fi router. Table III gives the catalogue of the UAV
controllers from eight different manufacturers. All the UAV
controllers transmit control signals in the 2.4 GHz frequency
band. In particular, a pair of UAV controllers from DJI Matrice
600 and DJI Phantom 4 Pro models are used while only one of
the other controller type is used. This is important for forensic
and security analysis to investigate the confusion that would
arise when a target recognition system attempt to distinguish
between UAV controllers of the same make and model. For
the remaining part of the study we will refer to the pair of DJI
Matrice 600 as DJI M600 Mpact and DJI M600 Ngat. Simi-
larly, the pair of Phantom 4 Pro controllers will be referred to
as DJI Phantom 4 Pro Mpact and DJI Phantom 4 Pro Ngat.
Fig. 12 shows the indoor and outdoor experimental scenar-
ios. In each case, the RF passive surveillance system detects
signals transmitted by the UAV controllers and the interference
sources. Due to space limitations, only the results of the
indoor experiments will be reported. The experimental RF
passive surveillance system consists of a 6 GHz bandwidth
Keysight MSOS604A oscilloscope with a maximum sampling
frequency of 20 Gsa/s, 2 dBi omnidirectional antenna (for
short distance detection), and 24 dBi Wi-Fi grid antenna
(for longer distance detection). The antennas operate in the
2.4 GHz frequency band. Detection range for the far field
scenario can be further improved by using a combination of
high-gain receive antennas and low noise power amplifiers
(LNAs).
The receiver antenna senses the environment for the pres-
ence of signals from UAV controllers. The collected data are
automatically saved in a cloud database for post processing.
For each controller, 100 RF signals are collected. Each RF
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Fig. 13. The signal detection accuracy of the Markov model-based naïve
Bayesian detector versus SNR for different values of δ.
signal contains 5000k samples and has a time span of 0.25 ms.
The database are partitioned with the ratio p = 0.2. That is,
80% of the saved data is randomly selected for training and
the remaining 20% is used for testing (4:1 partitioning).
VII. RESULTS
A. Detection Results
Detection performance of the proposed system is assessed
for different SNRs and threshold choices, and the results are
presented in Fig. 13. The selected thresholds are functions
of the standard deviation (σ) of the preprocessed noise data
and the FAR specification. The value of σ is estimated after
performing multiresolution analysis (wavelet preprocessing)
of a concatenation of several noise data captured from the
environment. On the other hand, FAR, also known as the
probability of false detection, is the percentage of false alarms
per the number of non-events.
Fig. 13 shows that at very low SNR, such as −10 dB, the
detection accuracy is generally very low irrespective of the
threshold. As a result, in case of low-level signals (where
signals completely buried in the noise), the probability of
missed detection increases. Besides, for a given SNR, it is
observed that the set threshold also affects the performance of
the detection system. For instance, when the system operates at
an SNR of 2 dB, a threshold of δ = 0.1σ will achieve a detec-
tion accuracy of above 99%. However, the threshold δ = 0.1σ
yields to a FAR of 100%. Therefore, a very low threshold
value will result in a high percentage of misclassification of the
noise data as signals. Furthermore, for the given SNR of 2 dB,
an increase in the threshold value to δ = 1.1σ will reduce the
detection accuracy and FAR to 96.6% and 14.8%, respectively.
Further increase in the threshold to δ = 2.5σ will greatly
reduce the detection accuracy and FAR to 40.4% and 3.2%,
respectively. Therefore, the optimum threshold depends on the
operating condition and the requirements on the FAR. Besides,
the input impedance of the oscilloscope places a fundamental
limit on the sensitivity of the passive detection system used in
this study.
In addition, Fig. 13 shows that better detection performance
(with low FAR) can be achieved if the detector operates at
higher SNRs (above 8 dB) and threshold δ ∈ [2.5σ, 4.1σ]. For
instance, when the receiver operates at an SNR of 10 dB with
a threshold δ = 3.5σ, the detection accuracy becomes 99.8%
and, FAR drops to 2.8%. Although a continuous increase in
the threshold will further reduce the FAR, it will not always
guarantee a better detection accuracy, especially when the
receiver operates at SNRs of less than 18 dB. This is because
the dissimilarity between the transition matrices of the RF
signal and noise classes reduces as δ increases beyond some
optimum value. Therefore, there is a high chance of detection
error as δ increases indefinitely.
Once a signal has been detected, the bandwidth and the
modulation-based features are estimated as described in Sec-
tion IV. This information is used to decide if the signal comes
from a UAV controller or any of the known interference
sources (Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sources). Given that the detected
signal comes from a UAV controller, it is sent to the ML-based
classification system for accurate identification. Classification
results are discussed next.
B. UAV Classification Results
For the classification problem, 15 statistical features given
in Table II are extracted. Feature selection is performed using
the NCA algorithm as described in Section V-A.
To validate the result efficiency of the NCA and the ML
classifiers, 10 Monte Carlo simulations are run on the test
dataset. On one hand, all the 15 features are used for the UAV
controller classification problem. On the other hand, only three
most significant features are used according to the NCA weight
ranking shown in Fig. 11. These are the shape factor, kurtosis
and variance. The classification experiments are run separately
for the case of 15 and 17 UAV controllers. Here, the number
of controllers represents the number of classes considered. In
the case of 15 controllers, all the controllers are of a different
model. However, in the case of 17 controllers, a pair of DJI
Matrice 600 (labeled as DJI Matrice 600 Mpact and DJI
Matrice 600 Ngat) and a pair DJI Phantom 4 Pro controllers
(labeled as DJI Phantom 4 Pro Mpact and DJI Phantom 4 Pro
Ngat) are considered in addition to 13 different models.
Table IV provides the classification accuracy of all five ML
algorithms. With the exception of the kNN classifier, the table
shows that the classification accuracy is only slightly higher
when all the features are used as compared to when only
the three selected features are used. Therefore, there is little
performance loss in using only the selected fingerprints. In
addition, there are computational savings in time and storage
when only the selected fingerprints are used for the classifica-
tion. The savings in time and computational resources may be
critical in aerial surveillance systems, where the response time
to effectively neutralizing a threat is very small. Moreover, as
the number of UAVs (to be classified) increases, the savings
in time will become more substantial. Hence, the results in
Table IV validates the decision to perform feature selection
using the NCA algorithm.
Table IV shows the RandF classifier yields the highest
classification accuracy when all the features are used. For the
case of 15 and 17 controllers, RandF achieves an accuracy
of 98.53% and 96.32%, respectively. Therefore, when all the
features are used, RandF is the best performing classifier. It is
followed by the kNN classifier, which achieves an accuracy of
97.30% and 95.62% with 15 and 17 controllers, respectively.
The DA classifier is the least optimal when all the features
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TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE ML CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS AT 25 dB SNR. 100 SAMPLE
SIGNALS FROM EACH UAV CONTROLLER IS CAPTURED WITH 80% USED FOR TRAINING
AND 20% FOR TESTING (PARTITION RATIO = 0.2). THE SELECTED RF FINGERPRINTS
ARE: SHAPE FACTOR, KURTOSIS, AND VARIANCE.
# of controllers Classifier Accuracy (%)2 Computational Time (s)2
All Feat. Selected Feat. All Feat. Selected Feat.
15
kNN 97.30 98.13 24.85 24.57
DA 96.30 94.43 19.42 18.58
SVM 96.47 91.67 119.22 111.02
NN 96.73 96.13 38.73 38.14
RandF 98.53 97.73 21.37 20.89
17
kNN 95.62 95.53 26.16 25.13
DA 92.77 88.12 19.36 18.90
SVM 93.82 87.88 139.94 141.68
NN 92.88 93.03 46.04 43.33
RandF 96.32 95.18 24.71 24.84
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Fig. 14. Box plot analysis of the classification accuracy of the ML classifiers
using the three selected features (shape factor, kurtosis, and variance) with
(a) 15 controllers, and (b) 17 controllers.
are utilized. On the other hand, when only the three selected
features are used, the kNN classifier performs the best with
an accuracy of 98.13% and 95.53% for 15 and 17 controllers,
respectively. It is followed by the RandF classifier which an
accuracy of 97.73% and 95.18% with 15 and 17 controllers,
respectively. When only the three most significant features are
used, the least optimal classifier is SVM. We also note that
the DA classifier has the shortest computational time whereas
the SVM classifier has the longest computational time.
2Both the accuracy and total computation time are the average of the 10
Monte Carlo simulations.
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Fig. 15. Classification accuracy versus SNR for kNN, RandF and DA
classifiers using the three selected RF fingerprints (shape factor, kurtosis, and
variance) as features for training and testing the ML classifiers.
Table IV provides only the average classification accuracy
results. A more detailed summary can be obtained from a
box plot analysis shown in Fig. 14. Each box plot gives a
summary of the performance of a classifier in terms of the
minimum, first quartile, median (red horizontal line), third
quartile, and the maximum accuracy values over 10 Monte
Carlo simulations. Comparing the box plots in Fig. 14(a) and
Fig. 14(b), we see that the box plot metrics for each classifier
are lower in the case of 17 controllers as compared to the
case of 15 controllers. This will be further investigated with
the help of the confusion matrix. In addition, the box plots
reveal the presence of outliers in the performance of the SVM
and NN classifiers. These outliers suggest that for a given
test signal, SVM and NN classifiers could produce accuracy
values well below the average values reported in Table IV.
This observation raises the concern about the reliability of
these classifiers for the UAV controller classification problem.
The SNR of the detected signal is an important factor that
influences the accuracy of the classifiers. Fig. 15 shows the
accuracy versus SNR for the kNN, RandF and DA classifiers.
For signals with SNR in the interval between 15 and 25 dB,
the kNN is slightly better than the RandF for the case of
15 controllers. In the same SNR region, the RandF performs
best for the case of 17 controllers. In this SNR range, the
DA classifier has the worst performance. On the other hand,
for SNR between 4 and 15 dB, the performance of the DA
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kNN, acc. = 95.53%, timeElapsed:25.13s
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(b) kNN with 17 controllers
RandF, acc. = 97.73%, timeElapsed:20.89s
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(c) RandF with 15 controllers
RandF, acc. = 95.18%, timeElapsed:24.84s
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(d) RandF with 17 controllers
DA, acc. = 94.43%, timeElapsed:18.58s
DJ
I In
sp
ire
 1 
Pro
DJ
I M
atr
ice
 10
0
DJ
I M
atr
ice
 60
0 M
pa
ct
DJ
I P
ha
nto
m 
4 P
ro 
Mp
ac
t
DJ
I P
ha
nto
m 
3
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
5e
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
6e
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
6i
Fu
tab
a T
8F
G
Gr
au
pn
er 
MC
-32
Ho
bb
yki
ng
 HK
-T6
A
Sp
ekt
rum
 JR
 X9
30
3
Fly
sky
 FS
-T6
Tu
rni
gy 
9X
Je
ti D
up
lex
 DC
-16
Target class
DJ
I In
sp
ire
 1 
Pro
DJ
I M
atr
ice
 10
0
DJ
I M
atr
ice
 60
0 M
pa
ct
DJ
I P
ha
nto
m 
4 P
ro 
Mp
ac
t
DJ
I P
ha
nto
m 
3
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
5e
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
6e
Sp
ekt
rum
 DX
6i
Fu
tab
a T
8F
G
Gr
au
pn
er 
MC
-32
Ho
bb
yki
ng
 HK
-T6
A
Sp
ekt
rum
 JR
 X9
30
3
Fly
sky
 FS
-T6
Tu
rni
gy 
9X
Je
ti D
up
lex
 DC
-16
O
ut
pu
t c
la
ss
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1-
(e) DA with 15 controllers
DA, acc. = 88.12%, timeElapsed:18.90s
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(f) DA with 17 controllers
Fig. 16. Confusion matrices of kNN, RandF and DA classifiers using the three selected RF fingerprints (shape factor, kurtosis, and variance). In the confusion
matrices, the colorbar is used to specify the degree of confusion in terms of the confusion probability ρ. Moving down the colorbar, the degree of confusion
increases with increasing value of ρ.
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classifier improves significantly, outperforming the kNN and
RandF classifiers when 15 controllers are considered. This
is an interesting observation since DA is known to have
the shortest computational time. However, for SNR between
0 to 4 dB, the RandF classifier has the best performance.
In general, the accuracy of all the classifiers increases with
SNR. Therefore, to ensure accurate identification of the UAV
controller, it is best to operate the receiver at SNR above
15 dB, in which case, kNN and RandF are the optimal
classifiers for the datasets. Fig. 15 also shows that for all SNR,
the accuracy plot is slightly lower when 17 controllers are
considered as compared to the case of 15 controllers.
The confusion matrix gives an idea of what a classifier is
getting right and the type of errors it makes. Fig. 16 shows the
confusion matrices of the classifiers: kNN, RandF and DA for
the case of 15 and 17 remote controllers. On the vertical axis
of each confusion matrix is the output class or the prediction
of the classifier while the horizontal is the target class or true
label. From the confusion matrices in Fig. 16, we observe
that in the case of 17 controllers, the degree of confusion
around the DJI controllers is relatively higher as compared to
the case of 15 controllers. This is because in the former, we
intentionally included two pairs of identical DJI controllers
(DJI Matrice 600 MPact, DJI Matrice 600 Ngat, DJI Phantom
4 Pro Mpact, and DJI Phantom 4 Pro Ngat). Consequently,
there are some confusions among these four controllers leading
to a slight reduction in the classification accuracy in the case
of 17 controllers. However, the kNN and RandF classifiers
still achieves an average accuracy of 95.53% and 95.18%, re-
spectively. Therefore, these classifiers are robust in identifying
UAV controllers of the same make and model. On the other
hand, the DA classifier is characterized by several more con-
fusions among different controllers which reduces its average
accuracy to 88.12% in the case of 17 remote controllers. Thus,
while the kNN and RandF seem to be the best classifiers, the
DA classifier still performs well for the given dataset.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem of detecting and classifying RF
signals from different UAV controllers is investigated. The
detection system is designed to operate in the presence of
wireless interference from Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sources. These
interference signals are detected using a multistage detector,
which estimates the bandwidth and modulation features of the
detected RF signals. Once the signal from a UAV controller
is detected, it is identified using RF fingerprints along with
the ML-based classification techniques. Reducing the number
of required features with the help of NCA, the study shows
that it is possible to achieve an accuracy of 98.13% in
classifying 15 different controllers using only three features
in a kNN classifier. It is also shown that the proposed system
can even classify the same make and model UAV controllers
without much compromising the overall accuracy. In addition,
the detection and classification performance of the proposed
system is tested for a range of SNR levels. In each task, the
system is shown to be safe for SNR levels of above 10 dB.
Future studies will present the detection of UAVs directly
from the UAV signals in outdoor scenarios and consider the
potential of sensor fusion for improved UAV detection.
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